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Keeping “the wheel in motion:” Trans-Atlantic Credit Terms, Slave Prices, and the 
Geography of Slavery in the British Americas, 1755-1807 
On 22 May 1775, Kingston merchant Malcolm Laing wrote to an absentee planter and suggested 
that a seven year prohibition on the slave trade to Jamaica would be “happy for this Country”. 
Laing’s extraordinary proposal—never before had a Jamaican planter ever recommended such a 
lengthy ban—came not from abolitionist sentiments, but concern for the standing of Jamaica’s 
credit in Britain. In 1772 a credit crisis had struck the British Atlantic, dampening the demand 
for captive Africans in the recently acquired Windward Isles and consequently pushing slaving 
vessels downwind to Jamaica, where slave imports had tripled by 1775.
1
 From the “great 
quantities of Negroes that has been sold for two years past,” Laing wrote, “the planters that 
purchased are now distressed by the Guinea Factors,” who were themselves trying “to raise 
money… to keep up their Credit in England.” By 1776, Jamaica’s Assembly were also 
concerned by the surge in slave imports, and complained to their London agent “how much they 
have been imposed upon by the Guinea merchants and factors in England, to the hurt and 
prejudice of this island,” who had struck down attempts by the assembly to impose a prohibitive 
duty on the slave trade.
2
  
The surge in Jamaica’s slave imports in 1772-6 illustrates the importance of credit to the 
operation of Britain’s trans-Atlantic slave trade. British merchants purchased approximately half 
of their outward cargoes from tradesmen through a “chain of credit” that connected the nascent 
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industrial regions of Lancashire and the Midlands to the major slaving ports of Liverpool, 
London, and Bristol (Pearson & Richardson 2008, p.769; Richardson 1976).  On the African 
coast, slave ship captains “trusted” their goods to African brokers, who themselves advanced 
credit to inland slave sellers (Lovejoy and Richardson 2001; Hancock 1995). African traders at 
Bonny and Old Calabar adopted particularly innovative and secure credit arrangements, enabling 
a larger number of captives to be procured and then loaded onto arriving British slave ships 
(Behrendt et al. 2010; Lovejoy and Richardson 2004, 1999). In the specie poor Americas, slave 
factors extended credit, allowing planters to purchase captives with the proceeds of future crop 
harvests, and boosting demand for new slave imports (Morgan 2005; Price 1991). Credit 
underpinned every leg of a slave ship’s voyage. 
Historians have paid particular attention to the “Bills in the Bottom” trans-Atlantic credit 
mechanism, which has been recently attributed by Robin Pearson and David Richardson an 
important role in both the development of modern financial institutions, and the success of 
British slave traders in the late eighteenth century. First introduced by Liverpool merchants in 
the 1750s, merchants received bills of exchange for the proceeds of their American slave sales in 
the ship or “bottom” that delivered the captives, in lieu of produce or the planters’ own bonds 
(Haggerty 2009; Inikori 2002). These bills were drawn upon and guaranteed by British bankers, 
a departure from earlier credit arrangements, which had only been between a captain and a 
planter or factor (Sheridan 1958; Davies 1952).  Bills in the bottom therefore moved merchants, 
according to Pearson and Richardson (2008, p.771, 776), away from personal business networks 
based upon “family or kinship”, to “less personal and more institutionalized arrangements for 
doing business,” an important step in the development of modern financial institutions.  




Bills in the bottom also “kept the wheel in motion,” as the slave traders described it, 
because they could be used to finance slaving voyages, lowering the trade’s entry costs, and 
enabling British merchants to ship more slaves and therefore outpace their foreign rivals.
3
 Bills 
in the bottom, argue Pearson and Richardson (2008, p.765), “promoted the unprecedented 
expansion of [the British slave trade] between 1750 and 1807”, and enabled British slavers to 
escape the pitfalls of colonial debt security, which had plagued the trade in the 1730s. French 
slave traders, by comparison, employed the “triangular trade” method of remittance throughout 
the eighteenth century, in which slaver captains brought home a portion of the sales in tropical 
commodities, and the balance as credit extended directly to the planters. Debt-stricken Franco-
American planters frequently failed to meet their obligations, making it difficult for French 
merchants to “complete the triangle” (Stein 1974, pp.114-118). Dutch slave traders likewise 
never solved the problem of colonial debt security (Morgan 2005). British slave traders expanded 
the volume of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and out-paced their European rivals during the 
second half of the eighteenth century, in part, because they used bills in the bottom, an 
innovative and relatively stable credit mechanism, to finance slave American sales. 
 Other historians have attempted to explain changes in the volume and direction of 
Britain’s slave trade in the eighteenth century by reference to productivity gains and seasonal 
cycles in the Atlantic. Using a large dataset, Eltis et al. (2005) found that slave prices in the 
Americas rose far and above parallel increases in the price of sugar, the main crop that captives 
worked to grow, implying a substantial productivity gain over the course of the eighteenth 
century. These higher slave prices drew in profit seeking European merchants who landed more 
captives in the Americas and so “[p]roductivity change was a key element in the growth of the 
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Caribbean slave population and the slave trade” (Eltis et al. 2005, p.696). Behrendt (2009, 2001), 
by contrast, uses seasonal patterns in the Atlantic to explain why captives were forcibly 
transported from specific African to American ports. British slave traders, Behrendt argues, 
attempted to time their voyages so as to coincide with crop harvests on both continents, 
maximizing slave prices, and hence profits. Productivity gains and seasonal patterns in the 
Atlantic thus help to explain the growth of the slave trade in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, and the movement of captives to particular American markets. 
 This paper contends that credit availability should be considered alongside productivity 
and seasonality as an important variable that helped to shape both the volume and direction of 
the slave trade to the British Americas during the last half of the eighteenth century. Using newly 
collected data on 330 voyages landing captives British-American colonies, c.1755-1807, it 
begins by describing the decision making process that slave trading merchants used when 
electing to sell slaves in the Americas, and then analyzes the lengths of credits issued for slave 
sales. It argues that credit terms and slave prices consistently differed between American 
colonies, resulting in noticeable changes in the direction of the British slave trade during periods 
of economic instability, as ship captains sought out the most financially secure markets in which 
to land their captive cargoes. Sections two uses as case studies four such instances, which 
coincided with the opening and closing years of the American Revolutionary (1775-1783) and 
French Revolutionary (1793-1802) wars, to illustrate how a lack of credit availability contributed 
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The British Americas comprised a number of individual slave markets, all of which depended on 
a common supply of imported captive Africans. Within each colony, “Guinea” or “slave” factors, 
agents who sold slaves in colonial port towns for commissions, attempted to draw ships to their 
markets by writing to British merchants and advertising potential sales.
5
 They also issued written 
“guarantees” to the merchants, which gave the slave ship captain the option to “sit down” with 
the factor if he brought his ship to the colony.
6
 The slave factor agreed in turn to draw bills of 
exchange for the proceeds the sale on a third-party banker in Britain, who “guaranteed” that he 
would accept the bills if brought to him, hence the name of the agreement. British slave traders 
accepted a number of guarantees from across the Americas, and within individual colonies, 
which they listed in written orders that were handed to the ship captain at the commencement of 
his voyage. These sometimes lengthy orders left most aspects of the voyage to the discretion of 
the captain, but were extremely specific with regards to the sale of the slaves, and instructed the 
captain to seek out a minimum “average” slave price and maximum length of credits at each 
American market, the captain’s so called “limits.”
7
  
 If a ship captain arrived in a colony stipulated by his orders, and the factor agreed to meet 
the limits, the two men arranged the sale by pricing the captives. The factor separated out the 
healthy “prime” slaves, from the sickly, old and young, who they designated as “refuse.” As one 
Jamaican slave factor explained, the “prime” slaves were sold at premium prices “fixed in some 
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measure” according to the price of crops; the season of the year; and the demand for captives 
prevailing at the time of the sale. These “prime” captives were sold at the beginning of the sale, 
usually for prices that were graduated according to the age and sex of the slaves, with men sold 
for more than women, and women more than children. The non-prime slaves were then 
“disposed of at prices according to their goodness,” as the Jamaican factor explained, sometimes 
in large lots at the end of the sale.
8
 This sale procedure certainly occurred in Jamaica, Saint Kitts, 
Saint Vincent, and South Carolina (Kelley 2013), and probably throughout the remainder of the 
British Atlantic.
9
 Although constrained by market conditions, the factor could, therefore, 
manipulate slave prices by altering the number of slaves classified as “prime.” Moreover, the 
factor needed to extend credit to planter purchasers, and could raise or lower slaves prices by 
either stretching or shortening the terms— or as South Carolinian slave factor Henry Laurens put 
it in 1764 “crimp[ing] the average merely for the sake of speedy payment.”
10
 Once the sale had 
been completed the factor calculated the “average” sale price, by dividing the gross proceeds of 
the sale by the number of slaves sold, a figure that slave ship owners used to decide where to 
order their captains in future.
11
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 By the late eighteenth century, factors did not ordinarily purchase captives from the vessel at one “wholesale” 
price, and then “retail” the same captives to planters or foreign islands at a higher price. This practice does seems to 
have been notorious in the 1760s when, for instance, one ship owner warned a captain to avoid factors who were 




 The Guinea factor also issued his bills of exchange for the net proceeds of the sale and at 
the lengths initially stipulated in his agreement with the captain. Guinea factors calculated the 
length of their bills, like slave prices, by taking into account a variety of local and international 
variables. They first assessed how long the bills would take to be covered by the planters’ own 
remittances, and therefore considered the prices and size of forthcoming crops, the season of the 
year when they could be shipped back to Britain, the length of bills given by competing factoring 
houses and, importantly, the price of slaves.
12
 Factors then issued their bills (which didn’t bear 
interest unless drawn at exceptional lengths) at dates longer than the bonds given by the planters, 
and in tranches to cover the staggered harvest of crops, typically at intervals of either three, six 
or twelve months “sight”, which commenced when the slave ship captain brought the bills for 
acceptance or “sight” in Britain (Morgan 2005; Price 1991). Both the length of credits and the 
prices of slaves were thus closely connected to the specific economic conditions of the American 
colony in which the sale took place, but could be partially influenced by the slave factor. 
British merchants considered the lengths of colonial credits when they decided whether to 
invest in the slave trade. Slave traders calculated the terms of credit issued for American slave 
sales by adding together the “sight” of each bill issued for a slave sale, and dividing the total by 
the number of equal tranches. If a set of bills were issued at three, six and nine months’ sight, the 
terms of credit would hence be six months.
13
 Each tranche of bills could be held until maturity, at 
which point their full value could be redeemed, or immediately discounted for cash at a rate of 
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five percent for every twelve months that the bills had left to run at specialist banking houses 
established in the major slaving ports of Liverpool, London and Bristol (Haggerty 2009; Inikori 
2002).
14
 A comprehensive study of one Liverpool merchant’s papers found that slave traders 
disliked discounting bills drawn for American sales, even when they extended to several years 
length (Anderson 1977). The discount rate diminished profits, and British merchants considered 
both the profits to be earned from a voyage, and the speed at which those profits would be 
redeemed, when assessing the success of a venture. Annual profits averaged around ten percent 
in the slave trade, and so merchants probably sought their American returns at no longer than 
two years sight, except when super profits could be earned (Inikori 1981; Richardson 1976; 
Anstey 1975; Dumbell 1931). Thus, the “ultimate yardstick of success or failure” in the slave 
trade was not, as Anderson (1977, p.80) found, the “achievement of a healthy rate of return,” but 
the “ability of the trader to realize his net profit quickly and easily on a regular basis” via 
colonial bills of exchange. The length of bills issued for slave sales was of the utmost importance 
to British slave trading merchants. 
 We can ascertain the actual lengths of credits issued for slave sales because merchants 
recorded remittances in their correspondence, ledgers and ship accounts, from which a dataset of 
330 slaving sales undertaken between 1755 and 1807 has been produced. Other scholars have 
extrapolated credit terms when discussing credit mechanisms used in the slave trade, but have 
not produced a comparable annualized data series. Price (1991) thought that credit terms 
averaged between three and nine months, and shot up to five years during two “slave gluts,” the 
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first in 1775-1777 and the second in the early 1790s, neither of which he explored.
15
 Morgan’s 
(2005) more comprehensive examination found a linear extension of credit terms after 1770, 
with bills running to three years by the mid-1790s. Eltis et al.’s (2005; Eltis & Richardson 2004) 
dataset of 1,066 slave prices drawn from all national carriers included credit terms in 141 
instances for British sales in 1755-1807, which they used to discount prices to cash equivalents. 
Where observations of credits could not be made, they assumed a linear progression in terms 
from nine months in 1756-1775, to twelve months in 1776-1793, and fifteen months in 1794-
1807. More recently, Pearson and Richardson (2008) found that credits ranged from six months 
in the mid-eighteenth century, to eighteen months at the end of the century, and Haggerty (2009) 
determined that bills extended from twelve months in 1770, to twenty-four months by 1787. 
Scholars have hence found that trans-Atlantic credit terms lengthened over the course of the late 
eighteenth century in a linear fashion. 
 Our larger sample of 330 voyages confirms the broad lengthening of credit terms issued 
over time, but also reveals that they fluctuated considerably in the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century, before falling in the opening years of the nineteenth century (Figure 1). When bills in 
the bottom was introduced during the 1750s, slaving merchants took the vast majority of their 
receipts in produce, with a small balance in the form of bills of exchange drawn at just three to 
four months sight. Credit terms steadily crept up throughout the 1760s and early 1770s, almost 
doubling over the course of ten years, tracking the trade’s steady expansion. In the same period, 
produce began to disappear from return cargoes, so that after 1765 the majority of vessels appear 
to have come home without produce as remittance, confirming that slave traders readily adopted 
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bills in the bottom after the Seven Years’ War.
16
 Bills shortened slightly in the first half of the 
1770s, but spiraled with the onset of the American War, reaching their peak in 1777, when they 
averaged twenty-six months. At the same time, the trade plunged towards its lowest level in the 
entire eighteenth century, eventually bottoming out in 1780. From 1780 until 1783, credit terms 
actually decreased back to their pre-war levels, despite the loss of several slaving markets in the 
Lesser Antilles, a result perhaps of Rodney’s victory at the Saintes in 1782, and a reduction in 
debts through a lack of slave sales.
17
 After the American Revolutionary War factoring houses 
lifted the terms of credit to twenty-one months, where they stayed with some variations until 
1793, when they surged again and reached their highest recorded peak of thirty-three months in 
1795. Although the sample for the period 1796-1807 (comprised of twenty-one voyages) does 
not allow for firm conclusions, the data available implies that credit terms may have plunged 
again. Considered over the entire period, 1755-1807, credit terms were relatively low and stable, 
but highly variable between 1772 and 1800, years when the trade reached some of its highest and 
lowest volumes. 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
At the level of individual slaving markets, credit terms and slave prices were consistently 
higher in the productive frontiers of slavery than in the older, settled colonies. Consider, for 
example, the various credit terms and slave prices, adjusted to cash equivalents, offered for 
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captive Africans in 1765-1774 in 1783-1792, two relatively stable peacetime period (Table 1). 
Slavers could obtain then £38 per captive at Barbados and the Leeward Islands and realize their 
returns within seven months. Alternatively, they could obtain £42 for a slave at the recently 
acquired Windward Islands (Dominica, Grenada, Saint Vincent, and Tobago), albeit with an 
average four month longer wait for the proceeds. At Jamaica, captives sold for £47 a person, 
helped in part by a sizeable re-export market to nearby Cuba and Hispaniola, although offset by 
some of the longest credit terms in the West Indies. The distinction between regions also applies 
within Jamaica: agents in the northwest frontier sold slaves for lengthier credit terms than those 
in the established Kingston market. This pattern repeats in 1783-1792, with higher slave prices at 
Jamaica, but credit terms much longer. In both periods, North America offered an inconsistent 
but sometimes lucrative market, as it was frequently opened and closed off to slavers by colonial 
and, later, US legislatures.
18
  
Insert Table 1 Here 
 British slaving merchants adjusted slave prices to account for the lengths of credit when 
seeking the most lucrative colony in which to land their captive cargoes. Liverpool merchant 
Robert Bostock instructed his slave ship captain in May 1792, for example, that “The Bills at 
Jamaica are longer sighted, so you must make your Calculations [where to land the slaves] 
accordingly,” and London slaver Thomas Lumley directed another captain in 1806 to be 
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“governed in your Average by the time the Bills may have to run.”
19
 Ship captains appear to 
have preferred, however, the Eastern Caribbean markets to those in distant Jamaica and North 
America when they had the option, forgoing higher slave prices, and saving on transportation 
costs (Eltis & Richardson 2005). Cash prices at the Windward Islands were four pounds lower 
than those to be earned in Jamaica in the period 1765-74, and eight pounds lower in 1783-92. 
Even so, the number of slaves landed in the Windward Islands in the first period almost matched 
those of Jamaica, and actually exceeded them in the second period. Barbados and the Leeward 
Islands, whose demand for new captives shrunk over the course of the eighteenth century, were 
largely bypassed by the second period, as larger ships sought out more lucrative markets in the 
Windward Islands or Jamaica (Behrendt 2001, pp.193-194). 
Slave ship captains disproportionately landed their captives in the Eastern Caribbean, 
despite the lower slave prices to be earned there, because of the peculiar geography of the British 
Americas. After departing Africa, slave ships followed the Atlantic winds and currents, and 
arrived in the Eastern Caribbean first, usually at Barbados. Captains then visited the markets 
stipulated in their orders seeking out a factor who could take them up at their stipulated limits, 
but, because of the Caribbean’s winds and currents, had to visit them in sequence. Trading at the 
turn of the nineteenth century, for example, London slavers Thomas Lumley and Company 
ordered one of their captains to arrive first at Surinam, and then run through eleven other 
American markets “in succession”
20
 Captives also understood that the longer voyage to Jamaica 
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or North America could have perilous consequences for the health of the captive cargo. In 1754, 
for example, John Newton landed his captive cargo in Saint Kitts, because the slaves’ would 
“drop fast had we another passage to make” (Newton 1962, p.81). When factors in the Eastern 
Caribbean markets could meet the limits stipulated in a captain’s orders, they tended to land their 
slaves there rather than proceed to Jamaica or North America.    
Captains also tended to stop in the Eastern Caribbean because they relied on incomplete 
information to guide them as they sought out slaving markets, making it difficult to receive up to 
date news on markets further to leeward. Captains did not sail completely blindly in the 
Americas, as they received news from their owners whilst slaving on the African Coast, and 
often upon their arrival at Barbados, where additional orders were lodged specifically to guide 
them in their sales.
21
 This information was, however, rarely current. Orders dispatched from 
Britain were at least four months out of date by the time they reached a slave ship captain, the 
shortest period of time that a packet boat could bring news back from the Americas, and then 
return with the updated instructions. Neither was information exchanged between colonies 
necessarily up to date. As one Jamaican planter stated in 1795, “There is no communication 
between this Island and Barbados or any of the Windward Islands,” because no ships plied a 
west-east route from Jamaica to the Eastern Caribbean in the face of contrary winds and currents, 




The lack of information and the peculiar geography of the Americas did not necessarily 
cause problems for merchants and captains in periods of economic stability, when slave prices 
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and credit terms were approximately the same upon a ship’s arrival in the Americas as when it 
departed Britain. As Liverpool merchant Edgar Corrie explained to Lord Hawkesbury in 
February 1788 though, captains searching for safe markets during periods of economic instability 
could create gluts in the supply of slaves to particular colonies, threatening the capitals of 
merchants and factors. If slave ships arrived in the Eastern Caribbean when demand was falling, 
Corrie explained, they proceeded towards the “ultimate markets,” as he termed them, of Jamaica 
or South Carolina, where they hoped to be “taken up at their limits”.
 
These colonies, which were 
not conceived of as a single unit by slave traders, were the final markets on the trans-Atlantic 
circuit because of their leeward position at the end of the chain of Caribbean Islands.
23
 Slave ship 
captains were forced to sell their captive cargoes at the “ultimate markets” regardless of the 
terms offered; beating back upwind against the prevailing wind and currents had dire 
consequences for the slaves’ health, as the voyage could take up to a month, almost as long as 
the Middle Passage. With other vessels following the same procedures, the “ultimate markets” 
were “frequently overdone with negroes.” The “effect,” Corrie explained, was “very severe” for 
“African merchants” as factors often “refused to take up a slave ship at an ultimate market” by 
issuing guaranteed bills of exchange. Factors agreed instead to send “the Planters bonds” as 
remittances upon the completion of the sale.
24
 
Planters’ bonds were issued to British slave traders as remittances for slave sales 
throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, but had been supplanted by bills in the 
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bottom by the time Corrie penned his letter, except as payments made by planters to factors 
(Davies 1957). The planters’ bonds were, like bills of exchange, drawn at stipulated periods, and 
had legal standing against the planter’s property after the passage of the Colonial Debts Act of 
1732 (Morgan 2005; Price 1991). Slave traders could therefore sue planters who reneged on their 
debts, and even repossess plantations and slaves, giving the bonds some standing as remittances 
for slave sales. However, slave traders disliked planters’ bonds because they were drawn upon 
distant property shielded by colonial legal systems, making suits difficult to prosecute, especially 
in Jamaica, where the C lonial Debts Act was loosely enforced (Long 1774, I). Moreover a 
single slave sale could return numerous assorted planters’ bonds, all of which had to be kept 
track of and recovered piecemeal over time by the slave trader, an inconvenience compared to a 
small bundle of bills of exchange drawn upon a single British banker.  
Slaving merchants had similar problems with another type of remittance, not mentioned 
by Corrie: the factor’s own promissory notes, which established a debt only between the factor 
and the slave trader. Although promissory notes had less legal protections than planters’ bonds, 
they tended to be more desirable to slave traders as a form of remittance because the merchant 
only had “one house to look to, instead of so many [different] people,” as one London slaver 
explained to his captain.
25
 Moreover, promissory notes drawn by men of good standing and 
reputation could still be circulated at a discount. Indeed, one Jamaican slave factor insisted on 
issuing his own promissory notes for slave sales he made during the late 1780s, enabling him to 
save the commission fee charged by a British guarantor.
26
 Even so, British slaving merchants 
generally disliked remittances that lacked a guarantee—planters’ bonds and Guinea factors’ 
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promissory notes—because they were less reliable than guaranteed bills, especially when they 
were drawn at distant dates in uncertain times. The dangers of receiving unguaranteed credit 
instruments prompted Edgar Corrie to identify American remittances as the premier risk posed to 
British slaving merchants, ahead of the purchase of captives in Africa, slave mortality, and 
shifting slave prices in the West Indies. The first three, Corrie argued, could reduce the 




Corrie’s letter helps to explain the fluctuating lengths of credits we observed in our 
sample of 330 slave sales by connecting them to slave prices and the geography of the British 
Atlantic slave markets. Slave factors calculated slave prices and the length of bills to be issued 
for slave sales based upon market conditions, with the Eastern Caribbean typically offering lower 
prices and shorter bills, and Jamaica and North America higher prices and longer credits. Ship 
captains constrained by winds, currents, and their ship owner’s orders, landed disproportionately 
large numbers of captives in the Eastern Caribbean when demand was robust there, particularly 
during periods of economic stability. When demand fell in the Eastern Caribbean, ship captains 
sailed downwind to the “ultimate markets,” resulting in an escalation in credit lengths and a fall 
in slave prices in both regions. When the “ultimate markets” exhausted their available credit, 
slave trading merchants found it difficult to obtain the short and secure remittances they required 
to fit out their vessels, reducing the volume of the trade. Instability in trans-Atlantic credit terms 
thus help to shape the contours of Britain’s slave trade in the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century. 
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Corrie informed Hawkesbury that periods of instability occurred “frequently” in trans-Atlantic 
credit terms, but did not mention any specific occurrences. We can discover the periods in 
question, though, by cross-referencing our dataset to the trans-Atlantic database, and identifying 
periods when falls in the volume of the slave trade coincided with lengthening terms of credit 
(Figure 1). In 1755-1771, credit terms were sufficiently low that they don’t seem to have caused 
major problems for slave traders, although complaints from one Liverpool trader indicate that 
there may have been a minor crisis in 1760/1.
28
 From 1801 until 1807, slave traders likewise had 
“little difficulty obtaining credit,” thanks to slave prices being driven up by planters fearful of the 
imminent abolition of the trade (Behrendt 2001).
29
 In the intervening years, 1772-1800, three 
periods of instability are striking: the first in 1772-1778 and another in 1783-1785, both of which 
would have been within Corrie’s memory, and a third after the date of Corrie’s letter in 1793-
1795. Although our sample is too thin to establish it with certainty, another period of instability 
may have occurred in 1799-1800. By examining these four periods in detail, we will see how 
instability in trans-Atlantic credit terms impacted upon the volume and direction of the slave 
trade. 
The roots of the instability in trans-Atlantic credit terms in 1772-8 can be traced to a 
rapid expansion in the Caribbean plantation economy after 1763. With produce and slave prices 
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rising in line with domestic demand for tropical staples during the “silver age of sugar” (Pares 
1956), planters were eager to expand their holdings and establish new estates, especially in the 
recently acquired Windward Isles (Quintanilla 2004; Murdoch 1984; Niddrie 1966). Planters in 
uncultivated lands there took out mortgages from London banks to purchase property and an 
enslaved workforce, hoping to repay the principal with the proceeds from the first crop (Smith 
2006).
 
In the one to two years it took to make their first remittances, however, the planters 
borrowed further using the same mortgaged assets as collateral. The expansion in the plantation 
economy therefore rested upon what Smith (2006, p.198, 220) calls a “debt pyramid” and, as a 
result, “instability was built into the expansion of the colonial trades during the third quarter of 
the eighteenth century”. In June 1772, this speculative bubble burst when the Glasgow tobacco 
trade fell into crisis, precipitating a financial panic that spread throughout Britain, Europe and the 
American colonies (Hoppit 2002; Sheridan 1960). 
 In January 1772, before the crisis had fully erupted, absentee Jamaican planter Nathaniel 
Phillips wrote from London, the center of finance for the slave trade, to inform his attorney that 
“There’s no doubt but we shall soon have as many Negroes sent down to our Island as may be 
wanted, for the Bills from the New Islands have not passed assent this year.”
30
 Twelve months 
later, Jamaica’s slave trade had almost doubled in volume (Figure 2). Meanwhile, shipments of 
captives to Barbados and Virginia almost disappeared, and those to the Windward Islands 
halved, all areas that had been sites of speculation prior to the crisis (Smith 2006; Price 1980). 
According to Kingston slave factors Bright & Millward, in June 1773 Jamaica had not been 
“materially affected” by the credit crisis, “blest as it has been this & two years past with good 
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crops” which would “keep the credit of its bills better than heretofore.”
31
 Moreover, the 
negotiation of a new asiento in October 1773 brought Cuban buyers to Kingston, who purchased 
3,000 captives with specie, propping up sales (Sheridan 1983). By 1775, Jamaica’s slave imports 
matched those of the rest of British Americas combined, a reversal from 1771, when Malcolm 
Laing had complained that Jamaican planters would have to obtain captives by directly investing 
in slave ships.
32
 South Carolina saw a similar expansion, with slave imports almost doubling 
between 1772 and 1773. A fall in demand in the Eastern Caribbean stemming from the 1772 
credit crisis thus pushed slavers into the “ultimate markets” of Jamaica and South Carolina, 
where they sought sustained planter demand and secure bills of exchange. 
 Merchants and planters understood the risk posed to Jamaican and South Carolinian 
credit by a sudden increase in slave imports. In March 1773, Henry Laurens wrote to a Liverpool 
slave trader about his fears that South Carolina would be “overstocked” after the “present Years 
Importation of Negroes,” and that the planters’ debts would “amount to much more than the 
Balance of another large crop.” He thus warned that if he himself was “concerned in the African 
Trade” he would “be cautious this Year of sending Many Negroes to Carolina.”
33
 Regardless, 
Carolinian planters imported 8,189 captives in 1773 and 6,361 in 1774, even as indigo and rice 
exports and prices sank, before the closure of Charleston to British shipping in December 1774 
by the Continental Congress (Nash 2010). By January 1775, the closure of North American 
markets, coupled with “so few ships selling in any of the Leward or Caribbe [sic] islands” made 
Lowbridge Bright “dread the consequence of so many [slave ships] going down to Jamaica, 
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which island is greatly in debt by the number already sold there.”
34
 Slave ship captain Peleg 
Clarke arrived in Montego Bay in March 1775 and found weak demand because “the planters are 
so Much in Debt from the grate quanty of Neagros that has been imported that the Guine Factors 
Do not incline to take up Guinamen at any rate [sic].” When he finally settled his sale, Clarke 
had to accept bills at the “monstrous length” of 17 months, terms matched in the other West 
India islands sampled in 1775.
35
  
 The onset of the American War exacerbated the strain. Congress’ embargo on exports to 
the West Indies doubled, and for some items tripled, the price of provisions between 1775 and 
1776, particularly in the more specialized Leeward and Windward Isles, eroding plantation 
profits (Carrington 2002, 1988; Sheridan 1976; Ragatz 1928). In July 1776, American privateers 
began operating in the Caribbean, capturing sugar ships carrying remittances back to England, 
driving up the cost of freight and insurance, and imperiling the over-stretched planters’ standing 
with their metropolitan factors (Herzog 1995; Starkey 1990; Jamieson 1983). A tenth of the 
slaving vessels arriving in the West Indies in 1776, specifically targeted by privateers, were also 
taken and their Africans auctioned off on in Martinique at a discounted value. In the next year, 
privateers took a quarter of Britain’s slave ships, further diminishing demand in the Windward 
Islands, which relied in part on visiting French buyers from Martinique and Guadeloupe to keep 
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up its slave prices. By 1776, the onset of war had reduced slave prices throughout the British 
Caribbean by between £5 and £8 (Eltis & Richardson 2004).
36
  
In 1776/7, factoring houses attempted to prop up slave prices by stretching the length of 
bills issued for sales, while some British bankers removed their guarantees from their colonial 
correspondents. In January 1776, a London slaving merchant complained that “Such is the 
difficualtys [sic] of the times at presant that no body will Engage here or give a Guarantee.”
37
 In 
May of the same year, another London trader opined that in light of the lengthening of credits, 
falling slave prices, and rapidly rising wartime operating costs, there would be “little trade after 
these [slave] ships that are already fitted out.”
38
 Arriving in Kingston in July 1776, just as 
privateers began to take their toll, a slaver captain received promissory notes from a Jamaican 
slave factor, “Witch seems to be the present mode for the sale of slaves.”
39
 A month later the 
Hibberts, a Jamaica factoring house thought to be “as good as a bank” in 1774, narrowly averted 
failure by accepting loans from prominent planters and resolved to “sell no more slaves at 
present except the Planter Bonds are taken in payment.”
40
 At the turn of 1777, Jamaican factors 
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Scerocold & Jackson stopped payment on its outstanding obligations causing a panic amongst 
the discounting houses, who then refused to accept West Indian bills of exchange without “value 
in hand,” immediate deliveries of produce to back the bills (O’Shaughnessy 2000).
41
 Five years 
later, two slave factors publicly brawled in Savanna-la-Mar, Jamaica, after the collapse of their 
firm, brought about by the protest of bills drawn for slave sales made in 1776/7.
42
  
These reports of failing West Indian credit are confirmed by our sample of 26 slave sales 
made between 1775 and 1777. In 1775, all eleven sampled ventures received their returns in 
guaranteed but lengthy bills of exchange. A year later, only four of eight ventures received 
guaranteed bills, one of which was protested when brought for acceptance, while two ventures 
received planters’ bonds, another silver coin, and one promissory notes issued by the factor. In 
1777, half of the eight sampled ventures received guaranteed bills, and the other half promissory 
notes. Seven of the eight vessels sampled in 1777 traded at the Lesser Antilles, so it is difficult to 
ascertain whether Jamaican factors were issuing planters’ bonds, as the reports claimed. Those 
vessels returning from Kingston in 1776, however, failed to obtain guaranteed bills, implying 
that the terms of remittance had shifted there. Moreover, in April 1777, Peleg Clarke elected to 
trade at Montego Bay because Kingston factors, including the Hibberts, were mediating planters’ 
bonds.
43
 As Corrie had described, then, shifting market conditions in the Americas—particularly 
the loss of South Carolina as an “ultimate market” and falling demand stemming from the 1772 
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crisis and the American War—obliged slave factors to either stretch the length of bills of 
exchange, issue their own promissory notes or mediate planters’ bonds.  
The experience of William Davenport, a Liverpool merchant who owned shares in 23 
slaving voyages in partnership with 30 other merchants in 1774-1777, illuminates the manifest 
difficulties that failing to obtain short and secure remittances posed for British slaving 
merchants’ businesses (Richardson 2004). In May 1777 Davenport’s captain, Peter Potter sailed 
into Barbados with 397 captives in the ship Badger, but could not be taken up at his specified 
limits. Potter took his ship to Dominica instead and consigned his human cargo to slave factors 
Vance, Caldwell, & Vance (VC&V), who wrote to Davenport that they “never had so much 
trouble in a Sale” due to the ready availability of prize slaves in the French Islands and low 
demand in the British islands and, as a result, they managed “so low an Average of £26 sterling 
per slave,” a significant drop from the £33 Potter received during the Badger’s previous voyage 
to Dominica in November 1775.
44
 More alarmingly, VC&V made their remittances with 
promissory notes at 30 months length which, Davenport complained, tied up his capital, making 
it “morally impossible to raise money to fit out ships,” a situation exacerbated by Dominica’s 
capture by the French in September 1778.
45
 Even after France returned the island to Britain in 
1783, Davenport continued to wrangle for his money until May 1792, when he finally wrote off 
the Badger’s account, along with the voyages of the Hector, Swift, and Dreadnaught, all of 
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which had traded at Dominica during the war. Sixteen years after his vessels had sailed, 
Davenport’s ledger revealed that his personal liability from the four voyages was £1,600, a 
withering blow given that his profits from 22 voyages made in 1772-4 had amounted to £1,700 
(Richardson 1976). Davenport also “laboured under great inconveniences” after the guarantee 
protested bills issued for the 1777 voyage of the Dalrymple to Antigua.
46
  
By 1779, Davenport had to request an extension on his obligations, because British 
bankers refused to discount bills of more than six months in length, and “the West India bills 
[issued for slave sales in 1776 & 1777] I have in Denisons [his London banker] hands are at such 
long credit.”
47
 However, a cache of stockpiled trade goods and the expectation of plummeting 
slave prices on the African coast drew Davenport back to the slave trade.
48
 In March 1779, 
Davenport wrote to Guinea factors attempting to establish “the terms of payment” which was 
“the only objection we have in fitting out ships to Africa.”
49
 Eventually, he secured a guarantee 
through a small factoring firm based in Old Harbor, Jamaica, to whom he promised three Guinea 
ships. However, upon the return of the vessels in March 1780, Davenport was horrified to find 
that the bills had been issued at “monstrous long dates” of 30 months. Participating in trade at 
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Other British slaving merchants faced similar liquidity problems. While Davenport 
struggled to obtain his returns, a consortium of nine Liverpool merchants led by Thomas 
Foxcroft attempted to recover the proceeds from their slaver Laurel, which had also traded to 
Dominica in January 1777.
51
 Sparling and Bolden, another Liverpool firm, had in August 1774 
received guaranteed Jamaican bills for their vessel Juba, which were protested when the 
acceptors Scerocold & Jackson went bankrupt, at which point Sparling & Bolden withdrew from 
the slave trade. After eighteen years fruitlessly chasing down their returns, Sparling & Bolden 
managed to sell their debt at ten shillings on the pound, a reasonable return on bills they thought 
worthless.
52
 George Burton, a London merchant, complained in 1783 that he could “do nothing” 
because his capital was “locked up in Jamaica” by slaving voyages made in 1774.
53
 These men’s 
experiences were not exceptional: three-quarters of Liverpool’s slaving merchants in 1776 had 
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Between 1772 and 1778, instability in trans-Atlantic credit terms thus shifted captive 
Africans into “ultimate markets” in the Americas, and caused liquidity problems for British slave 
trading merchants. In the wake of the 1772 credit crisis, merchants diverted slaves to Jamaica 
and South Carolina, where slave factors lengthened their bills of exchange and, in some cases, 
altered the mode of remittance to planters’ bonds or promissory notes, especially after the onset 
of the American War. By relying on the quick circulation of receipts above large capital stocks, 
British slaving merchant left themselves open to such swift changes in the terms of remittance, 
obliging many to withdraw their investment, and contributing to the trade’s decline to its lowest 
level in the eighteenth century, where it remained until peace in 1783. 
In the immediate aftermath of the American Revolutionary War, 1783-1785, British 
merchants rapidly returned to the slave trade, but experienced the same problems of instability in 
colonial credits that had afflicted the trade in 1772-8. Upon the declaration of peace in 1783, 
planters, including those in South Carolina, which had been re-opened to slave imports, were, in 
one merchant’s estimation, “in the utmost distress for [slaves], and disposed to give good Prices 
on condition of having indulgence in the payments.”
55
 Factoring firms allowed briefly shortened 
their terms of credit, confident that the end of the war would return to its pre-war conditions.
56
 
Slave traders were disappointed in 1785, however, when the South Carolina market was closed 
to slave imports, and credit terms raised to 24 months, what one London slaver called 
“confounded long winded Credits.”
57
 These terms seems to have been sufficient to deter some 
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merchants from investing in the trade. In October 1785, for example, textile suppliers Sargeant 
Chambers & Company commiserated with James Rogers, a Bristol slave trader because “bills 
extended to such unreasonable lengths” which “is certainly a great disadvantage to the [slave] 
trade.” Eight months later, the same firm wrote to lament the fact that Rogers had declined fitting 
out two slave ships because of the lengths of West India bills of exchange.
58
 Others followed 
Roger’s in withdrawing their capital from the trade: between 1784 and 1785 the overall volume 
of the slave trade decreased by a fifth, almost all of which occurred in the “ultimate market” of 
Jamaica, where slave imp rts halved in 1785, and then halved again in 1786 (Figures 1 & 2).  
Jamaica’s slave trade remained at one of its lowest levels of the late eighteenth century 
until 1789-1796, when the island experienced a boom and bust in its slave imports, a result of the 
inefficiencies in the American slave markets that Corrie outlined. Concerned that the supply of 
Africans would be cut off by the abolitionist campaign in Parliament, and enjoying access to a 
larger market for their sugar in the wake of the 1791 Saint Domingue slave revolt, planter 
demand drove up the prices of enslaved Africans throughout the British Caribbean (Ryden 2009; 
Eltis and Richardson 2004; Sheridan 1983; Klein 1978; Horsfall 1948). In June 1790, even 
before the Saint Domingue revolt, Kingston merchant David Duncombe confidently claimed to 
his Bristol partner that “The time for the sale of Negroes were scarcely ever better then they are 
now—the planters in general getting out of debt… the demand for Negroes brisk & firm… The 
terms given to the owners of Guinea men are also favourable.”
59
 Spurred by favorable American 
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markets conditions, British slave traders landed 42,192 captive Africans in the Caribbean during 
1793, the trade’s largest level to date.
60
  
 The onset of an Atlantic-wide credit crisis in February 1793 and the simultaneous 
outbreak of war with France dampened the planters’ demand for captive Africans, especially 
after an American embargo deprived the British Caribbean of low-priced provisions.
61
 In June 
1793, when the credit crisis struck the West Indies, John Tailyour, an absentee Jamaican slave 
factor whose extensive papers have recently been discovered, heard from his company Taylor, 
Ballantine & Fairlie (TB&F) that “most of the guarantees are stopped to Windward[,] expect the 
bills [in Jamaica] will be still longer.”
62
 Deliveries of captives to Jamaica—now the sole 
“ultimate market” for British ships given South Carolina’s closure to slave imports—increased 
by 50 percent between 1792 and 1793, so that the island absorbed two thirds of the captives 
brought to British America in 1793 (Figure 2). Marveling at the surge in slave imports, Tailyour 
opined that three quarters of the vessels trading at Kingston in 1793 had been diverted from their 
original intended markets, including the north side of Jamaica where Simon Taylor, his sugar 
planting cousin informed him, “they give their [promissory] notes for the sale of the Cargoes, 
they have been glutted, and their credits are stopped.”
63
 In June 1793, Kingston factors 




 For the effect of the embargo on the slave trade, see WCL, JTP, Box 7, Simon Taylor to John Tailyour, 20 June 
1793; Mouser ed. 2002, pp.114-115. 
62
 WCL, JTP, Box 6, TB&F to John Tailyour, Kingston, 19 June 1793. 
63
 Plantation Life in the Caribbean (hereafter PLC), Reel 15, John Tailyour to Simon Taylor, Teddington, 1 October 
1793. WCL, JTP, Box 7, Simon Taylor to John Tailyour, Kingston, 16 October 1793. Imports of captives to 
Jamaica’s out-ports fell from 7,946 people in 1793, to just 374 in 1794. Those to Kingston, by contrast, fell from 
20,602 to 13,021 (TASTD). For Simon Taylor, see Sheridan 1971. 




responded to the credit crisis and influx of slaves by stretching the lengths of the bills they issued 
for slave sales from 15 to 24 months.
 
 
 British merchants found themselves strained by the credit crisis, and elected to withdraw 
their investment from the slave trade. Clearances from Liverpool, by far Britain’s largest slaving 
port, plummeted from 128 vessels in 1792 to 49 in 1793, the majority dispatched either before 
the crisis or in the closing months of the year.
64
 Liverpool slave traders Tarleton and Rigg, 
writing to Tailyour, attributed the fall to the parlous state of West India markets: “The slow sales, 
low averages, & above all no returns in Bills which took place in the course of [1793], have 
deterred some & disabled others from adventuring to Africa at present.”
65
 One of those 
“deterred” from the trade was Liverpudlian Ralph Fisher, who notified Tailyour that he would 
dispatch one of his unemployed slave ships only if he could obtain “a sufficient guarantee in this 
country, for bills at a short period” for it was “impossible to carry on the trade for bills at the 
periods have been given.”
66
 Liverpool merchant John Dawson, possibly the world’s largest 
individual slave trader, verged on bankruptcy in 1793, and in the next year was seeking cash or 
short bills from American slave sales so as to maintain liquidity (Rawley 2005).
67
 Bristol slaver 
James Rogers’ business collapsed, leaving a mountain of debts amounting to £100,000, and 
substantially diminishing his town’s tightly concentrated slave trade (Morgan 2003; Richardson 
1987). Writing to a British friend in May 1793, Simon Taylor thought that the lengthening terms 
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of credits for slave sales in Jamaica, coupled with the failures of “5 of the most Capital African 
Houses” meant that “there will be very few [slave] ships fitted out during the Warr [sic].”
68
   
 Although some British merchants were setback, others were lured back into the trade by 
the capture of several French islands, which promised lucrative new markets for enslaved 
Africans, especially compared to the glutted British colonies. Edgar Corrie, now acting as 
Tailyour’s Liverpool agent, wrote to him that “With new markets opening… I expect that every 
Negroe carried in for sale in 1794 will be wanted And the factors will receive the most 
immediate & safest payment.”
69
 Slaving merchants anticipated a British capture of Saint 
Domingue—which had imported more slaves than the entirety of British America in 1790—
coupled with the recent acquisition of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Saint Lucia would provide 
an outlet for captives obtained by ships currently “running the race to Angola,” an enormous 
African slaving market left open by the disappearance of French competition at the onset of war 
(Duffy 1987).
70
 Moreover, in Liverpool, the Common Council managed to largely curtail the 
deleterious effects of the credit crisis by the end of 1793 by injecting capital into the money 
markets (Hyde et al. 1951). In April 1794, Liverpool merchants were said to be fitting out 
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vessels with “great spirit,” in anticipation of ready sales for captive Africans in the Americas.
71
 
Between July 1794 and March 1795, however, the re-capture of Guadeloupe by the French, 
insurrections in Saint Vincent, Dominica, and Grenada, and the British army’s decimation by a 
yellow fever outbreak in Saint Domingue substantially reduced the markets available to slave 
ships arriving in the West Indies (Duffy 1987; Geggus 1979). Without alternative outlets, slaves 
continued to enter Jamaica, where factors pushed their credit terms to thirty months in September 
1794 and dropped slave prices by £3 per person.
72
  
 Tailyour’s correspondence details the tension that the extension of credit terms in 1793-
1795 placed upon William Miles, his British guarantee (Morgan 1985). In April 1794, Miles 
thought the West Indies to be in the worst danger he had seen in his forty years engaged in trade: 
“I see nothing but Ruin attending the present appearance of things,” Miles wrote, suggesting 
Tailyour “make a Dead Stand in the African Line.”
73
 A statement of account sent to Tailyour in 
September 1794 revealed a balance outstanding to Miles of £200,000 for slave sales, a burden 
that had a “visible effect upon [Miles’] health and spirits.”
74
 With the time lag in 
communications, and vessels continuing to arrive in Jamaica holding a guarantee for his 
company, TB&F took up another fourteen slaving vessels in late 1794 and early 1795. In March 
1795, Miles, beset for six months by “constant nervous complaints” stemming from his large 
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outstanding debts, ordered Tailyour to “put a final stop to all further Sales of African Ships.”
75
 
TB&F finally ceased drawing bills on Miles in the same month and instead remitted planters’ 
bonds or promissory notes for slave sales. In May 1796, TB&F took up the Roman Emperor’s 
captive cargo, their last sale, and issued promissory notes for the proceeds, a procedure followed 
by some other Kingston firms.
76
 In the same year, Jamaica’s share of slave imports almost 
halved compared to the previous year, as captains stopped at more lucrative markets to 
windward, such as Demerara, which had been captured in 1795, and Trinidad, which was 
acquired a year later (Figure 2).
77
 Slavers avoided the war-torn Windward Island, however, 
where Alexander Houston and Company, backer of Munro McFarlane & Company, Grenada’s 
principal slave factoring firm, collapsed in 1795, shortly followed by the Baillie family company, 




 A smaller credit crisis also occurred in 1799-1800, briefly increasing the volume of 
Jamaica’s slave trade. In September 1799, John Tailyour’s brother Robert, a partner in the 
London West India house Taylor, Hughan & Renny, reported to him that there had been “several 
bankruptcies lately in London,” stemming from a panic in Hamburg, Germany.
79
 The crisis soon 
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spread to American markets and, by November, there was said to be “no sale for W[e]st Ind[ia] 
Produce almost at any price,” in London, where “hardly any bills from [the Caribbean] were 
accepted.”
80
 As in other periods of scarce credit, Jamaica’s share of the slave trade spiked as 
slave ships bypassed markets in the Eastern Caribbean: in 1799, thirty-five percent of the 
captives brought to the British Americas had been landed in Jamaica, increasing to fifty percent 
in 1800. Taylor, Hughan & Renny had fitted out four slave ships in February 1799, before the 
onset of the crisis, with great hopes for profits.
81
 By March 1801, when one of their ships 
reached Jamaica, they rued their investment: bills of exchange issued for slave sales had leapt in 
Kingston from an average seventeen months in 1800 to thirty months. “It certainly would never 
answer,” Robert Tailyour told his brother, to be fitting out slave ships and “receiving Bills at 30 
Months” for the remittances.
82
 By 1802, several large Kingston slave factoring firms were 
reported to be suffering substantial losses from bad planter debts, some amounting to as much as 
£35,000 sterling.
83
 In that year, Jamaica’s share of the slave trade halved, to twenty-five percent 
of the British trade, a low level it continued at until the imminent abolition of the trade drew 
Guineamen back to the island in 1807 (Figure 2).  
In December 1807, when the slave trade had already been abolished in Britain, a 
Liverpool merchant advised his ship captain arriving in Kingston to try and recover doubtful 
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outstanding debts stemming from the 1799-1800 crisis. Hardy, Pennock & Britton, a Kingston 
Guinea factoring firm, had sold the Duke of Clarence’s human cargo in June 1800 but, 
financially strained, had issued a combination of bills of exchange, planter’s bonds, and produce 
to the captain as remittances. Soon after, Hardy, Pennock & Britton’s affairs fell into a “deranged 
state,” when the firm collapsed, leading to a lengthy battle to recover the remittances. “The Bills 
and Produce after a great deal of trouble we have got settled,” the ship owners wrote, but the 
planters’ bonds, originally issued at an average one year period, still remained outstanding seven 
years later.
84
 Until the very end of the legal period of the slave trade, then, British slave traders 
struggled to obtain secure remittances from their American slave sales. 
  Examining four periods of instability in trans-Atlantic credit terms—1772-1778, 1783-
1785, 1792-1795, and 1799-1800—thus shows why British merchants found it difficult to obtain 
short and secure remittances, essential to f t out slave ships, during periods of financial and 
military uncertainty. When influxes of captives strained slaving markets, factors stretched the 
length of bills issued for slave sales, hoping to prop up slave prices and draw reticent planters. 
With lengthy bills drawn upon them in uncertain times, metropolitan guarantors tried to limit 
their exposure to risk by withdrawing their guarantees from their colonial partners, and insisted 
on the rapid collection of outstanding debts, aiming to avoid having to pay slave trading 
merchants out of their own funds. When guarantees withdrew their backing, factors were forced 
to either issue promissory notes or mediate planters’ bonds, causing British slave trading 
merchants to dispatch their vessels to other markets, abandon the trade entirely, or face severe 
liquidity problems. 
III 
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Our sample of 330 slave sales and our case studies indicate that historians have been right 
to attribute the innovative bills in the bottom credit mechanism an important role in shaping 
Britain’s trans-Atlantic slave trade. In the long run, bills in the bottom was, as Pearson and 
Richardson (2008) have argued, a successful underpinning to Britain’s trans-Atlantic slave trade, 
enabling sustained growth over the course of the late eighteenth century, particularly into new 
areas of plantation agriculture, such as the Windward Islands and, later, Trinidad and Demerara. 
However, the long term success of the arrangement masks considerable short term instability, 
which played an important role in shaping the sharp contours of Britain’s slave trade in the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century. In that period, the unavailability of American slaving markets, 
either through an oversupply of slave imports, or capture by foreign powers, frequently 
concentrated the slave trade to a few limited locations, where the factors’ standing with their 
metropolitan guarantees would be strained. The risk of planter default then shifted away from the 
guarantors of bills of exchange, to British slave traders, who were sometimes left with factors’ 
promissory notes or planters’ bonds which they struggled to circulate and cover their own 
obligations. At those moments, British slave traders found it difficult to invest in the trade, and 
withdrew or re-directed their vessels, resulting in noticeable changes in both the volume and 
direction of the trade. 
 Disentangling these shifts from the adverse effects of warfare is, of course, difficult, 
given that periods of instability in credit terms coincided with the outbreak or end of major 
conflicts of the late eighteenth century. During wartime, insurance and outfitting costs raised, 
commodity prices could sag, forts in Africa and islands in the Caribbean could be lost, and slave 
ships ran the risk of capture. Yet warfare were not always a hindrance to slave traders if lucrative 
markets were available in the Americas. In the wartime years 1756-1761, for example, privateers 




took between a quarter and a fifth of British slaving vessels, while the overall volume of the 
trade increased. Likewise, although approximately a quarter of Guineamen cleared out of British 
ports were captured every year between 1794 and 1796, the trade had almost reached its pre-war 
level by 1797. During the American Revolutionary War comparable losses to privateers were 
sustained only in 1777-1779, and by that point the British slave trade was already in steep 
decline, something that experienced Liverpool slaveship captain Robert Norris attributed to 
economic causes: “tis not ye American War”, Norris wrote, “tis not the state of ye trade on ye 
Coast of Africa but merely the low ebb of w[e]st India credit that occasions a temporary 
stagnation of ye [slave] trade.”
85
 During the French Revolutionary War, Liverpool slave traders 
were also, as we saw, eager to fit out slave ships despite the risks of capture at sea and rising 
outfitting costs, because they expected France’s Caribbean markets, and especially Saint 
Domingue, to be open to slave imports. Warfare thus played an important role in shaping in the 
volume and direction of Britain’s slave trade in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, but not 
necessarily because of the adverse effects of military action. Rather, by opening and closing 
colonies to the slave trade, warfare exacerbated the inefficiencies that were already inherent in 
the British American slaving markets, and therefore increased the instability of colonial credits.  
The varying lengths and stability of trans-Atlantic credits thus helps us to explain the 
pattern of Britain’s slave trade in the second half of the eighteenth century, especially when they 
are considered in conjunction with the inefficient structure of American slave markets. The 
inadequacies of eighteenth-century communications meant that ship captains did not arrive in the 
Americas with perfect information on the price of slaves in each colony. Neither could they 
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always chose the colony that offered the highest slave prices, as the winds and currents pushed 
them in one direction through a sequence of markets. In extreme circumstances, slavers had no 
option but to sail for an “ultimate market,” where they would be obliged to sell their captives for 
whatever price was offered at the time. Captains found it particularly difficult to link seasonal 
patterns in the Atlantic (Behrendt 2009, 2001) or seek out the most productive American colony 
(Eltis et al. 2005), during 1772-1800—a period when the slave trade reached some of its highest 
and lowest peaks—as they pursued secure remittances for their sales. While productivity gains 
and seasonality do much to explain long term growth and short term movement in the slave 
trade, we must also acknowledge that Britain’s trans-Atlantic slave trade was, as contemporaries 
called it, a “wheel” of commerce “kept in motion” by the supply of credit. 
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Table 1: Average slave prices and credit terms received at British American slaving 






















38 37 14 7 19  42,080 
Windward Isles 42 40 28 11 27  93,641 
Jamaica 47 44 16 14 7  99,955 























48 46 7 11 11 17,549 
Windward Isles 48 45 35 15 37 125,312 
Jamaica 57 53 62 20 73 116,278 
North America 59 55 2 16 2 6,221 
 
Source: For credit terms, see Figure 1. In some instances, only slave prices or credit terms were observable, 
hence the disparity in the sample sizes.  
Methodology: Adjusted slave prices are taken from the TASTD, and are expressed in constant pounds, that 
is adjusted for inflation and exchange. They have also been adjusted to account for differences in 
transportation time between markets, and for lengths of credits, where available. The adjusted prices 
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Figure 1: Aggregate length of credit terms issued for slave sales (months) vs. captive Africans 
disembarked in the Americas (number) by British flagged vessels, 1755-1807 
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Sources: TASTD, estimates section, British flagged vessels only; Liverpool Record Office (LRO), 380 MD 34, Case & Southworth Journal, 1757-1761; LRO, 
387 MD 40-4 Thomas Leyland & Co Ship Account books; LRO, 387 MD 59, Letter Book of Thomas Leyland, 1786-1788; LRO, 920/TAR/4/77, Tarleton 
Family Papers; LRO, MD 219 1, Letterbook of Sparling & Bolden, 1788-99; LRO, 380 TUO, Tuohy Papers; LRO, 920/CHA/1, Rainford Family Papers; LRO, 
387 MD 54-55, Letter book, etc. of Robert Bostock, I-II; Merseyside Maritime Museum (MMM), D/DAV, Archives of William Davenport 1725-97; MMM, 
Earle Family Papers, William Earle’s Letterbook 1760-1761; MMM, DX/1908/6, Tods to Brassey; Keel University Library, Raymond Richards Collection, 
Davies Davenport Papers; Donnan 1932-1935, III-IV; TNA, C109/401, Accounts for the Slave Ships Barbados Packet, Meredith, Snow Juno, Saville and 
Cavendish; TNA, T70/1534, T70/1536, T70/1549/1, Detached Papers;  TNA, E140/2/5, Barlett vs Campbell; TNA, E219/377, Exhibits Re SS Comte du Nord; 
TNA, C114/1-2, C114/154-158, Messrs Thomas Lumley & Co, Correspondence and Accounts; TNA, E219/340, Taylor v Holmes; TNA, C107/1-15, C107/59, 
James Rogers Papers; Bristol Record Office, G2404, Snow Africa’s Trading Accounts; William Clements Library, University of Michigan, John Tailyour 
Papers; NLS, Alexander Houston Papers, Account Ledger 1794-7, Ms.8895; Morgan ed. 1985, p.105; P.P., V.68, f.52. 
Methodology: The backbone of this sample comprises 89 slaving voyages made in 1758-86 and recorded in the papers of William Davenport, Liverpool 
merchant. A further 42 voyages have been obtained from the recently discovered papers of Jamaican Guinea factor John Tailyour, and cover 1783-1796. The 
remaining 199 voyages come from a variety of sources, principally the Case & Southworth, James Rogers, Alexander Houston, Rainford family, and Thomas 
Lumley papers.  By recording the terms of payment for each voyage in a database, aggregate credit terms have been calculated and analyzed. This dataset 
represents the most comprehensive attempt to quantify terms of credit issued for British slave sales, and accounts for approximately 90,000 Africans disembarked 
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 Figure 2: Percentage of captive Africans disembarked in the “Ultimate Markets” of Jamaica and North America, 1755-1807 
 
Source: TASTD, estimates section, British flagged vessels only 
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